Federal response King assassination riots
1 federal response
1.1 military deployment
1.2 legislative response
1.3 communication city , state governments
federal response
president lyndon b. johnson , joe califano chart riot outbreaks in washington, dc.
on april 4, president lyndon b. johnson denounced king s murder. began communicate host of mayors , governors preparing reaction black america. cautioned against unnecessary force, felt local governments ignore advice, saying aides, m not getting through. re holing generals in dugout getting ready watch war.
on april 5, @ 11:00 am, johnson met array of leaders in cabinet room. these included vice president hubert humphrey, u.s. supreme court chief justice earl warren, supreme court justice thurgood marshall, , federal judge leon higginbotham; government officials such secretary robert weaver , d.c. mayor walter washington; legislators mike mansfield, everett dirksen, william mcculloch; , civil rights leaders whitney young, roy wilkins, clarence mitchell, dorothy height, , walter fauntroy. notably absent representatives of more radical groups such sncc , core. @ meeting, mayor washington asked president johnson deploy troops district of columbia. richard hatcher, newly elected black mayor of gary, indiana, spoke group white racism , fears of racially motivated violence in future. many of these leaders told johnson socially progressive legislation best response crisis. meeting concluded prayers @ washington national cathedral.
according press secretary george christian, johnson not surprised riots followed: did expect? don t know why re surprised. when put foot on man s neck , hold him down 3 hundred years, , let him up, s going do? s going knock block off.
military deployment
after watts riots in 1965 , detroit riot of 1967, military began preparing heavily black insurrection. pentagon s army operations center began response assassination on night of april 4, directing air force transport planes prepare occupation of washington, d.c. army dispatched undercover agents gather information.
on april 5, johnson ordered mobilization of army , national guard, particularly d.c.
legislative response
some responded riots suggestions improving conditions engendered them. many white house aides took opportunity push preferred programs urban improvement. @ same time, members of congress criticized johnson. senator richard russell felt johnson not going far enough suppress violence. senator robert byrd suggested washington, d.c. ought occupied indefinitely army.
johnson chose focus political capital on fair housing bill proposed senator sam ervin. urged congress pass bill, starting april 5 letter addressed speaker of united states house of representatives, john william mccormack. these events led rapid passage of civil rights act of 1968, title viii of known fair housing act .
communication city , state governments
audio records reveal tense , variable relationship between johnson , local officials. in conversations chicago mayor richard j. daley, johnson describes complications ordering federal troops before local governments have exhausted options. later, johnson describe domestic unrest front in global war, criticizing daley not requesting troops sooner. transcript:
president johnson: [unclear] . . . goddammit, don t know how handle these things. know 1 thing: ve got handle them muscle , toughness. , put troops in every place asked me to, , came after [in] reasonably shape.
daley: thing is, there s of destruction takes place before re able to--that observation. have these things destroyed before ever--
president johnson: well, s right. now, mayor, if want judgment s wrong, s wrong not asking it.
in same call, johnson told daley wanted use strategy of pre-emption: d rather move them , not need them need them , not have them.
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